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Abstract 
 
What dynamics shape public risk perceptions? What significance should public views have in the 
formation of risk regulation? In Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005), Cass 
Sunstein catalogs a variety of cognitive and social mechanisms that he argues inflate public esti-
mations of various societal risks. To counter the impact of irrational public fears, he advocates 
delegation of authority to politically insulated experts using economic cost-benefit analysis. 
Missing from Sunstein’s impressive account, however, is any attention to the impact of cultural 
cognition, the tendency of individuals to adopt risk perceptions that reflect and reinforce their 
cultural worldviews. Relying on existing and original empirical research, we use this dynamic to 
develop an alternative “cultural evaluator” model, which better explains individual variation in 
risk perception, differences of opinions among experts, and the intensity of political conflict over 
risk than does Sunstein’s “irrational weigher” model. Cultural cognition also complicates Sun-
stein’s policy prescriptions. Because the public fears that Sunstein describes as “irrational” ex-
press cultural values, expert cost-benefit analysis does not merely insulate the law from “factual 
error,” as Sunstein argues; rather, it systematically detaches law from popular understandings of 
the ideal society. Indeed, the best defense of Sunstein’s program might be just that: by eliding the 
role that risk regulation plays in endorsing contested cultural visions, expert cost-benefit analysis 
protects the law from a divisive and deeply illiberal form of expressive politics. The difficult task 
for those who understand the phenomenon of cultural cognition and who favor democratic modes 
of policymaking is to devise procedures that assure popularly responsive risk regulations both 
rational and respectful of diverse cultural worldviews. 
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Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation 
of Sunstein on Risk 
 
Dan M. Kahan,* Paul Slovic∗∗ 
Donald Braman,∗∗∗ and John Gastil**** 
To secure the public good . . . and at the same time to preserve the 
spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object 
to which our inquiries are directed. 
— James Madison1 
[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself . . . . 
— Franklin D. Roosevelt2 
The effective regulation of risk poses a singular challenge to 
democracy. The public welfare of democratic societies depends on 
their capacity to abate all manner of natural and man-made haz-
ards — from environmental catastrophe and economic collapse to 
domestic terrorism and the outbreak of disease. But the need to 
form rational responses to these and other dangers also challenges 
democratic societies in a more fundamental way: by threatening 
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their commitment to genuinely deliberative policymaking. Effective 
risk regulation depends on highly technical forms of scientific in-
formation — epidemiological, toxicological, economic, and the 
like. Most citizens don’t even have access to such information, 
much less the inclination and capacity to make sense of it. Why, 
then, should regulatory law afford any weight to the uneducated 
opinions of ordinary citizens as opposed to the reasoned judgments 
of politically insulated risk experts? 
It is the urgency of this question that makes the study of risk 
perception a policy science of the first order. Employing a diverse 
array of methods from the social sciences, the field of risk percep-
tion seeks to comprehend the diverse processes by which individu-
als form beliefs about the seriousness of various hazards and the 
efficacy of measures designed to mitigate them. Risk perception 
scholars are not of one mind about the prospects for making public 
opinion conform to the best available scientific information on risk. 
But no one who aspires to devise procedures that make democratic 
policymaking compatible with such information can hope to suc-
ceed without availing herself of the insights this field has to offer. 
Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 
is a major contribution to the field of risk perception written in pre-
cisely this spirit. In Sunstein’s view, the major thing proponents of 
democratically grounded risk regulation have to fear, in essence, is 
fear itself. Adroitly synthesizing a vast body of empirical literature, 
Sunstein catalogs the numerous social and cognitive mechanisms 
that drive members of the public to form wildly overstated esti-
mates of various societal dangers. Sunstein identifies a number of 
important institutional devices designed to shield “deliberative de-
mocracy” from the pernicious influence of these “risk panics” (p. 
1). They include, principally, a form of expert cost-benefit analysis 
that would separate out considered public values from irrational 
public fears, and a set of administrative procedures that would 
make law responsive to the former and impervious to the latter. 
Few recent works in the field of risk perception rival Sunstein’s in 
breadth, intelligence, and relevance. 
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But as masterful as Sunstein’s account is, its persuasiveness is 
undercut by Sunstein’s inattention to one of the most important 
recent advances in the science of risk perception. A growing body 
of work suggests that cultural worldviews permeate all of the mecha-
nisms through which individuals apprehend risk, including their 
emotional appraisals of putatively dangerous activities, their com-
prehension and retention of empirical information, and their dispo-
sition to trust or distrust competing risk-information purveyors. As 
a result, individuals effectively conform their beliefs about risk to 
their visions of an ideal society. This phenomenon — which we 
propose to call “cultural cognition” — not only helps to explain 
why members of the public so often disagree with experts about 
matters as diverse as global warming, gun control, the spread of 
HIV through casual contact, and the health consequences of ob-
taining an abortion; it explains why experts themselves so often 
disagree about these matters, and why political conflict over them 
is so intense. 
The phenomenon of cultural cognition underwrites a strong 
critique of the analysis that Sunstein presents in Laws of Fear. Once 
the influence of culture is taken into account, what Sunstein sees 
as public hysteria is often revealed to be a complex form of status 
competition between the adherents of competing cultural visions. 
This reformulation of public risk sensibilities in turn undermines 
much of Sunstein’s normative account of how the law should re-
spond to public risk perceptions. Because citizens’ fears express 
their cultural visions of how society should be organized, the line 
between “considered values” and “irrational fears” often proves il-
lusory. Reliance on expert cost-benefit analysis, in these circum-
stances, becomes less a strategy for rationally implementing public 
values than a device for strategically avoiding political disputes 
over individual virtue and collective justice. 
Unfortunately, though, it’s not clear that incorporating cul-
tural cognition into the science of risk perception reduces the com-
plexity of reconciling rational risk regulation with democratic deci-
sionmaking. A theory of risk perception that incorporates cultural 
cognition is teeming with insights on how to structure risk commu-
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nication; by linking risk perception to cultural values, it identifies 
myriad new strategies for managing public impressions (particularly 
affect-laden ones) of what risks are real and what risk-mitigation 
strategies are effective. But at the same time such a theory makes 
the prescriptive dimension of risk regulation more tractable, it 
makes the normative dimension of it considerably harder to assess. 
If risk disputes are really disputes over the good life, then the chal-
lenge that risk regulation poses for democracy is less how to recon-
cile public sensibilities with science than how to accommodate di-
verse visions of the good within a popular system of regulation. Fear 
itself may indeed be what democratic societies, or at least pluralistic 
ones, most have to fear — not because governmental responses to 
risk are likely to be irrational, but rather because risk regulation is 
inherently fraught with the potential for illiberality. 
We will develop this response to Sunstein’s Laws of Fear in 
four Parts. In Part I, we will explicate Sunstein’s account. Sun-
stein’s theory is best understood within the context of a debate 
over two competing models of risk perception — one that sees in-
dividuals as rational weighers of risk and another that sees them as 
irrational weighers. 
In Part II, we examine the dynamic that Sunstein’s account 
overlooks: cultural cognition. We will show how cultural cognition 
supports a distinct model of risk perception — one in which indi-
viduals behave neither as rational nor irrational weighers but rather 
as cultural evaluators of risk. In Part III, we will show how this 
model calls into question the central positive, normative, and pre-
scriptive components of Sunstein’s account. 
Finally, in Part IV, we will examine what the cultural evalua-
tor model of risk reveals about the tension between risk regulation 
and liberalism. Surprisingly, one response to this tension might be 
to base public policymaking on an irrational-weigher theory such as 
Sunstein’s, precisely because that model overlooks the cultural un-
derpinnings of public risk perceptions. 
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I. Sunstein and the “Irrational Weigher” Model 
Advances in the field of risk perception have been fueled by an 
energetic debate between the proponents of two opposing theories. 
These theories, which we will call the “rational weigher” and “irra-
tional weigher” models, posit competing accounts of the nature of 
individual judgments of risk and how the law should respond to 
them. Sunstein’s account is most readily understood within the 
context of this debate. Thus, we begin with a general overview of 
the points of contention between the rational-weigher and irra-
tional-weigher models and then turn to the particulars of Sun-
stein’s sophisticated articulation of the latter. 
A. Two Conceptions of Individual Risk Perception: Rational vs. Irra-
tional Weighing 
Grounded in the assumptions and methods of neoclassical 
economics, the rational-weigher model asserts that individuals, in 
aggregate and over time, form judgments toward risk that maximize 
expected utility. Decisions to take a hazardous job (say, as a con-
struction worker),3 to purchase a potentially dangerous consumer 
good (perhaps a chainsaw),4 or even to engage in manifestly un-
healthy forms of personal recreation (smoking cigarettes5 or unsafe 
sex)6 — all ultimately embody a considered balancing of costs and 
benefits. 
To be sure, people suffer from imperfect information, make 
mistakes, and even lack the capacity to follow through on what 
they correctly perceive to be in their best interests. But as a result 
of chance variation and market-based and related forms of social 
                                                 
 3 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and 
Safety in the Workplace 37 (1983). 
 4 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theo-
retical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353, 358 (1988). 
 5 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision 
(1992). 
 6 See, e.g., Thomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Private Choices 
and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an Economic Perspective 57 – 83 
(1993). 
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selection, whatever departures from utility maximization these im-
pairments might induce in particular individuals can be expected to 
cancel each other out across individuals. Accordingly, even if no 
individual approaches risk in a perfectly rational fashion, people 
behave as if they were doing so in aggregate.7 
The rational-weigher model counsels a generally restrained 
role for governmental risk regulation. If people left to their own de-
vices can be expected to make choices that maximize their well-
being, then devising legal regimes and institutions to regulate risk 
taking is largely unnecessary and indeed ultimately destructive of 
societal wealth and individual freedom.8 The only circumstance in 
which regulatory intervention is clearly warranted is when utility-
maximizing individuals can be expected to expose others to risks 
the expected costs of which are not fully borne by those creating 
them. But when imposing regulation to combat externalities of this 
sort, regulators should not, according to proponents of the rational-
weigher model, be guided by their own personal judgments of what 
types of risk taking are socially desirable. Rather they should try to 
base regulatory standards on the preferences implicit in the behav-
ior of persons who do fully internalize both the costs and benefits of 
putatively dangerous activities. In effect, regulatory responses to 
risk should mimic the individual responses revealed in markets and 
related forms of collective behavior.9 
The irrational-weigher model, in contrast, posits that people, 
considered individually or collectively, approach matters of risk in a 
manner that systematically fails to maximize their utility. Drawing 
on social psychology and behavioral economics, the proponents of 
this position have cataloged a vast array of cognitive limitations 
and defects that distort popular perceptions of risk.10 Thus, indi-
                                                 
 7 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 374–84; Viscusi, supra note 3, at 4. 
 8 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 3, at 4; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 383. 
 9 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 3, at 114–35.  
 10 See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 1–50 (2000) (cataloging vari-
ous social psychological mechanisms that distort lay perceptions of risk); Roger 
G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regu-
lation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990) (same). 
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viduals are disposed to wildly overestimate the magnitude of highly 
evocative risks (say, of a nuclear power accident) and to ignore less 
evocative ones (say, of developing cancer from peanut butter).11 
Far from canceling each other out, the types of risk-estimation er-
rors that people are prone to make on an individual level tend to 
become even more exaggerated as individuals interact with one 
another. Various mechanisms of social influence cause popular risk 
perceptions to reinforce and feed on themselves, generating waves 
of mass incomprehension.12 
The irrational-weigher model counsels a much more aggressive 
program of governmental regulation. The cognitive defects and so-
cial forces that tend to distort risk perception have the biggest im-
pact on members of the lay public; scientifically trained experts are 
less vulnerable to these influences because they routinely access 
and comprehend accurate sources of information, form more bal-
anced mental inventories of the harms and benefits associated with 
various putatively dangerous behaviors, and converge on consensus 
judgments through rigorous exchanges with other, similarly well 
informed observers.13 It thus makes sense to entrust matters of en-
vironmental regulation, consumer protection, workplace safety, 
and the like to such experts, who should be insulated as much as 
possible from politics to avoid the distorting influence of the pub-
lic’s misapprehension of risk.14 
We have sketched out the rational- and irrational-weigher 
models in their purest forms. It’s possible, of course, to formulate 
                                                 
 11 See, e.g., Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Halina S. 
Brown, Jacque Emel, Robert Goble, Jeanne X. Kasperson & Samuel Ratick, The 
Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 Risk Analysis 177, 178 
(1988); see also Slovic, supra at note 10, at 37–38; Noll & Krier, supra note 10, 
at 754 – 55.  
 12 See, e.g., Kasperson et al., supra note 11, at 179–86.  
 13 See Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the 
Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues 71 – 97 (1996). 
 14 For an influential statement of this view, see Stephen Breyer, Break-
ing the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993). 
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intermediate positions that include elements of both.15 Even more 
important, it’s possible to qualify either model based on considera-
tions external to both. Some exponents of the irrational-weigher 
model, for example, are careful to distinguish divergences between 
lay and expert risk assessments that reflect the bounded rationality 
of the public from those that reflect “rival rationalities”: one, on 
the part of experts, that seeks to reduce all issues of risk to a uni-
tary expected-utility metric; and another, on the part of the public, 
that includes qualitative elements of appraisal that defy such a met-
ric.16 But the pure forms of the rational- and irrational-weigher 
models are both well represented in the study of risk perception 
and furnish useful reference points for making sense of any particu-
lar scholar’s position. 
B. Sunstein on Risk 
Sunstein’s position, as reflected in Laws of Fear, embodies the 
premises of the irrational-weigher model in an essentially unquali-
fied form. Indeed, based on his systematic description of the dy-
namics that drive public risk perceptions and his detailed norma-
tive prescriptions for shielding risk regulation from the distorting 
influence of these forces, Sunstein’s theory can be viewed as the 
most instructive account of what the irrational-weigher model en-
tails for law. 
1. Descriptive. — Sunstein’s conception of the irrational-
weigher model of risk contains two components. The first com-
prises the various psychological mechanisms that dispose individu-
als to systematically misestimate risk. The second highlights the 
                                                 
 15 One might characterize Kip Viscusi’s more recent work, which treats 
market and other private behavior toward risk taking as rational and political 
responses as irrational, in this way. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Pol-
icy (1998). 
 16 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 137–53, 285–315. For an innovative at-
tempt to build qualitative evaluations of risk into a framework of cost-benefit 
analysis that minimizes the distorting influence of various cognitive biases, see 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Dis-
counting of Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999). 
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social forces that magnify popular assessments of risk as individuals 
interact with one another. 
Among the former is the “availability heuristic.” This dynamic 
refers to the tendency of individuals to “assess the magnitude of 
risks” based on how “easily . . . [they can] think of . . . examples” of 
the misfortunes to which these risks give rise (p. 36).17 Thus, nu-
clear power triggers alarm because of the notoriety surrounding the 
accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; the hazards of toxic 
waste disposal assume massive proportions because of the publicity 
that surrounded the Love Canal affair; arsenic levels in drinking 
water generate apprehension because “arsenic is [a] well known 
. . . poison,” in part due to the “classic movie about poisoning, Ar-
senic and Old Lace” (pp. 37–38). The influence of the availability 
heuristic can easily distort public judgment, moreover, insofar as 
calamitous misfortunes, however isolated, are much more likely to 
grab media attention and stick in the public memory than are the 
myriad instances in which risky technologies, chemicals, or proc-
esses generate benefits for society.18 
Another mechanism that distorts public risk perceptions is 
“probability neglect.” This is Sunstein’s term for characterizing an 
asserted disposition of persons “to focus on the worst case, even if it 
is highly improbable” (p. 35). To maximize expected utility, indi-
viduals ought to discount the gain or loss associated with a course 
of action by the probability that such an outcome will occur.19 Ex-
perimental research shows, however, that individuals are less likely 
to discount in this fashion when they are evaluating outcomes that 
provoke strongly negative emotions such as fear; the cost individu-
als are willing to incur to avoid such outcomes is relatively insensi-
tive to the diminishing probability that such outcomes will occur.20 
For Sunstein, this finding implies that ordinary citizens are likely to 
                                                 
 17 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 37–38. 
 18 Cf. Margolis, supra note 13, at 94–97. 
 19 See generally David Sklansky, The Theory of Poker 9–11 (1999). 
 20 See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and 
Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psychol. Sci. 185 (2001).  
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support expensive measures, however remote the risks and however 
cost-ineffective the abatement procedures. Examples, he argues, 
include massive investments in toxic waste cleanup and cumber-
some procedures for screening mail for anthrax (pp. 83–85). 
Additional related mechanisms converge to make individuals 
unduly insensitive to the benefits of risky technologies. One of 
these mechanisms is “loss aversion.” Typically, “a loss from the 
status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desir-
able” (p. 41).21 Another is the “endowment effect.” Individuals 
value goods more once they have them than they did before they 
acquired them;22 as a result, they are likely to resist courses of ac-
tion that require them to risk goods they have to achieve states of 
affairs they would value even more (p. 42). Individuals also display 
a form of “status quo” bias23 (p. 42): in appraising a potentially 
beneficial but also risky course of action, they fall back on the 
maxim “[b]etter safe than sorry”24 (p. 47) to justify inaction.25 In 
tandem, these dispositions generate a species of conservatism that 
causes individuals to seize on the potential “losses produced by any 
newly introduced risk, or by an aggravation of existing risks,” to 
block new technologies without “concern[] [for] the benefits that 
are forgone as a result” (p. 42) (emphasis omitted). This is the ex-
planation, according to Sunstein, of “[w]hy . . . people [are] so 
concerned about the risks of nuclear power” even though “experts 
tend to believe that [nuclear power] risks are . . . lower, in fact, 
than the [environmental] risks from competing energy sources, 
such as coal-fired power plants . . .” (p. 47). 
                                                 
 21 This is an application of Kahneman and Tversky’s famous “prospect 
theory.” See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 263–91 (1979). 
 22 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. 
Perspect. 193, 193–206 (1991). 
 23 See id.  
 24 Sunstein here quotes Margolis, supra note 13, at 5. 
 25 See id. at 74, 165–89. 
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Another distorting mechanism is affect. The emotional re-
sponses that putatively dangerous activities trigger in persons have 
been shown to be one of the most robust predictors of how risky 
they perceive such activities to be.26 Indeed, Sunstein plausibly de-
picts the impact of affect as foundational to nearly all other 
mechanisms of risk perception. The availability of risks is regulated 
by how emotionally gripping the images of misfortune they provoke 
are (pp. 38–39). It is “when intense emotions are engaged [that] 
people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not on its likelihood” 
(p. 64). Persons react conservatively and display status-quo bias or 
loss aversion because “[w]hen [they] anticipate a loss of what 
[they] now have, [they] can become genuinely afraid, in a way that 
greatly exceeds [their] feelings of pleasurable anticipation when 
[they] look forward to some supplement to what [they] now have” 
(p. 41). 
The distorting influence that these psychological mechanisms 
exert on individual risk perceptions is magnified, according to Sun-
stein, by two social forces. Sunstein calls the first of these “avail-
ability cascades” (p. 95). For the same reason that “fear-inducing 
accounts” of misfortune with “high emotional valence” are likely to 
be noticed and recalled, they are also likely “to be repeated, leading 
to cascade effects, as the event becomes available to increasingly 
large numbers of people” (p. 96). “[A] process of this sort,” Sun-
stein maintains, “played a large role in the [reaction to the] Wash-
ington area sniper attacks, the Love Canal scare, [and] the debate 
over mad cow disease” (p. 94). Availability cascades also help ex-
plain “moral panics” in which large segments of society suddenly 
come to perceive “religious dissidents, foreigners, immigrants, ho-
mosexuals, teenage gangs, and drug users” as sources of danger (p. 
98). 
                                                 
 26 See generally Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. 
MacGregor, Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, 
Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 Risk Analysis 311 (2004); Melissa L. Finucane, 
Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect Heuristic in Judg-
ments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 1 (2000); George F. 
Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee & Ned Welch, Risk as Feel-
ings, 127 Psychol. Bulletin 267–86 (2001). 
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“Group polarization,” the second social force Sunstein dis-
cusses, magnifies the impact of individual biases when individuals 
engage in deliberations over risks and how to abate them.27 Indi-
viduals don’t moderate their views when they engage in such dis-
cussions, Sunstein argues; on the contrary, “they typically end up 
accepting a more extreme version of the views with which they be-
gan” (p. 98). If one view is even slightly predominant within a 
group when it starts deliberation, arguments in favor of that posi-
tion will predominate in discussions, fortifying the confidence of 
those who hold that position and making a bigger impact on the 
undecided. This effect will be reinforced by the subconscious desire 
of persons to conform their view to the apparent majority, and by 
the reluctance of those who perceive themselves to be in the mi-
nority to express a public stance that might expose them to ridi-
cule. 
Despite his emphasis on “[r]isk panics” (p. 1), Sunstein recog-
nizes that the same dynamics that make “people . . . fearful when 
they ought not to be” can also make them “fearless when they 
should be frightened” (p. 1). Indeed, one state almost entails the 
other. This is partially because so many risks are offsetting. A soci-
ety that pays inordinate attention to the risks of nuclear power 
necessarily pays too little to the risks associated with fossil fuels 
(e.g., global warming and acid rain) (pp. 27–28). Many societies 
that ban the pesticide DDT because they fear its carcinogenic ef-
fects are insufficiently mindful of the increased incidence of malaria 
associated with using less effective substitutes (p. 32).  
Excessive and insufficient fear also tend to mirror each other, 
according to Sunstein, because of the largely hidden – and hence 
emotionally tepid – financial impact of risk-reducing regulation. 
Sunstein cites studies suggesting that every $7 million to $15 mil-
lion in costs incurred to comply with governmental regulation is 
itself associated with the expected loss of one human life because of 
the adverse effect of such expenditures on the economy (pp. 32–
                                                 
 27 See generally Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased As-
similation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098–2109 (1979). 
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33). Accordingly, many costly programs that only slightly reduce 
the magnitude of man-made or natural risks (such as the amount of 
arsenic in drinking water) actually end up costing more lives than 
they save (pp. 28–29).  
It thus becomes impossible (practically and maybe even con-
ceptually) to say which — excessive fear or excessive fearlessness 
— dominates in public risk perceptions. But one conclusion that 
can be drawn from Sunstein’s account is that the public, impelled 
by emotion and waves of public hysteria to fixate on some risks and 
wholly disregard others, can never be expected to get it right. The 
greatest risk to the public’s health may be its own risk assessments. 
2. Normative and Prescriptive. — Sunstein has just as much to 
say about what the law should do to respond to distorted public 
perceptions of risk as he does about the forces responsible for dis-
torting them. Not surprisingly, he unequivocally rejects a “populist 
system[]” (p. 1) of regulation that takes public risk evaluations at 
face value. Indeed, one of the major objectives of Laws of Fear is to 
critique the so-called “precautionary principle” as unduly respon-
sive to public sentiments. That principle, which enjoys worldwide 
support among environmentalists and regulatory authorities (pp. 
15–18), asserts, essentially, that “when there is scientific uncer-
tainty as to the nature of th[e] damage or the likelihood of the risk” 
posed by some activity, “then decisions should be made so as to 
prevent such activi[ty] . . . unless and until scientific evidence 
shows that the damage will not occur” (p. 19) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).28 When enforced by democratically responsive in-
stitutions, this approach, Sunstein maintains, yokes regulatory law 
to the various mechanisms — availability, probability neglect, 
status quo bias, and various forms of social influence — that make 
the public irrationally fearful of “low-probability risks” (p. 26). At 
the same time, because fixation on particular risks is always accom-
panied by inattention to offsetting risks and the adverse societal 
impact of regulatory expenditures, the precautionary principle in-
                                                 
 28 Quoting Cloning: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Labor, Health and 
Human Services of the S. Comm. On Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2002) (state-
ment of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth). 
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evitably forces society to forgo “technologies and strategies that 
make human lives easier, more convenient, healthier, and longer” 
(p. 25). 
Unfortunately, Sunstein concludes, public irrationality of this 
sort cannot be dispelled by education. The same mechanisms that 
cause members of the public to form exaggerated perceptions of 
risk will also prevent them from processing scientifically sound in-
formation in a rational way. Because “people neglect probability,” 
for example, even accurate disclosure of risks may induce them to 
“fix, or fixate, on the bad outcome,” thereby “greatly alarm[ing] 
people . . . without giving them any useful information at all” (p. 
123). Rather than emphasize how small a risk is, a better way to 
dispel irrational fear, Sunstein argues, is to “[c]hange the subject,” 
“discuss something else and . . . let time do the rest” (p. 125). 
Ultimately, though, even this strategy of distraction is unlikely 
to calm public anxieties, because scientists and enlightened regula-
tors aren’t the only ones speaking (or not) to the public. “Terror-
ists[,] . . . environmentalists[,] and corporate executives,” among 
others, can all be expected to strategically “exploit probability ne-
glect” and related dynamics (p. 65). Propelled by “economic self-
interest,” news media, too, can be expected to intensify risk hys-
teria by reporting “[g]ripping instances” of misfortune, “whether or 
not representative” of the activities that give rise to them (p. 103). 
For Sunstein, there is only one credible treatment for the pa-
thologies that afflict public risk assessment: the delegation of regu-
latory authority to independent expert agencies. “If the public de-
mand for regulation is likely to be distorted by unjustified fear, a 
major role should be given to more insulated officials who are in a 
better position to judge whether risks are real” (p. 126). 
Such experts, Sunstein maintains, are relatively immune from 
the influences that inevitably distort public risk estimations. Draw-
ing on social psychology’s “dual processing” model of cognition, 
Sunstein contrasts two forms of information processing: “System I,” 
which is “rapid, intuitive, and error prone” because pervaded by 
“[h]euristic-based thinking” of the sort responsible for exaggerated 
estimations of risk; and “System II,” which is “more deliberative, 
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calculative, slower, and more likely to be error free” (p. 68).29 By 
virtue of their training, the time they have to reflect, and their reli-
ance on one another rather than misguided popular sources of in-
formation, scientific experts can be expected to use System II rea-
soning when appraising risks (pp. 85–87). 
Investing politically independent experts with substantial au-
thority, Sunstein insists, would not make risk assessment funda-
mentally undemocratic. “[W]ell-functioning governments,” he ob-
serves, “aspire to be deliberative democracies” (p. 1). They take ac-
count of the public’s anxieties, but their “responsiveness is com-
plemented by a commitment to deliberation, in the form of reflec-
tion and reason giving” (p. 1). Accordingly, “if highly representa-
tive institutions, responding to public fear, are susceptible to error, 
then it is entirely appropriate to create institutions that will have a 
degree of insulation. Democratic governments should respond to 
people’s values, not to their blunders” (p. 126). 
The principal tool that expert regulators should use to distin-
guish public values from public misperceptions is cost-benefit analy-
sis. Using this technique, regulators would assess the efficiency of 
risk-abatement measures by comparing their own calculations of 
the magnitude and probability of harm associated with risky tech-
nologies and substances to the value individuals (as revealed largely 
through market behavior) attach to life and limb (pp. 131).30 
                                                 
 29 For the classic statement of the “dual process” position, see Shelly 
Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source 
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 752 (1980). 
The “System I/System II” terminology comes from Daniel Kahneman & Shane 
Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, 
in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49, 51 (Tho-
mas Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
 30 Here Sunstein advocates an approach that is largely consistent with 
that favored by rational-weigher theorists. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 15 at 
126–28. The difference, presumably, is that Sunstein would favor regulation in 
many contexts in which rational-weigher theorists are content to rely on mar-
kets. See id. (arguing that markets, when they internalize relevant costs, do better 
at neutralizing various forms of individual irrationality than do government 
agencies, which often magnify them). 
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Although he acknowledges that this methodology is far from 
perfect, Sunstein holds that cost-benefit analysis furnishes an indis-
pensable tool for the rational regulation of risk in a democracy. Be-
cause it cleanses risk assessment of the contaminating influences of 
availability, probability neglect, affect, and the like, “[i]t is an im-
portant way of disciplining public fear — of creating a kind of Sys-
tem II corrective against System I heuristics and biases” (p. 130). 
Sunstein allows that cost-benefit analysis “provides [only] a 
place to start” and “should not be taken as decisive” for the law (p. 
174). On reflection, popularly accountable lawmakers might well 
conclude that other values, including the welfare of poor people, 
the protection of endangered species, or the preservation of pristine 
areas, are worth the cost of enduring economically inefficient regu-
lation (p. 129).  
There is one particular type of popular veto, however, that 
Sunstein’s conception of “deliberative democracy” can rarely if ever 
abide: second-guessing of the magnitude experts assign to various 
risks. Here, as elsewhere,31 Sunstein reacts with deep skepticism 
toward the “rival rationality” hypothesis, which depicts many dis-
agreements between expert and lay perceptions of risk as grounded 
in differences of value, not knowledge. “Often experts are aware of 
the facts and ordinary people are not” (p.86). “Hence a form of ir-
rationality, not a different set of values, often helps explain the dif-
ferent risk judgments of experts and ordinary people” (p. 86). It is 
precisely to root out public irrationality in perceptions of the “cost” 
of risky technologies, in particular, that cost-benefit analysis by in-
dependent agencies is essential. 
II. The Cultural Evaluator Model 
Sunstein’s account rests on an admirably comprehensive syn-
thesis of the empirical literature on risk perception. However, this 
literature features an important dynamic to which Sunstein is strik-
ingly inattentive: the impact of cultural worldviews. To set up our 
assessment of how this omission detracts from Sunstein’s account, 
                                                 
 31 Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1119, 1122–37 
(2002) (reviewing Slovic, supra note 10). 
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we begin with a summary of the recent work in this area, which, we 
will argue, supports an alternative to both the rational-weigher and 
irrational-weigher models of risk perception. 
A. Cultural Cognition: Theory and Evidence 
The claim behind cultural cognition is that culture is prior to 
facts in societal disputes over risk. Normatively, culture might be 
prior to facts in the sense that cultural values determine what sig-
nificance individuals attach to the consequences of environmental 
regulation, gun control, drug criminalization, and the like. But 
more importantly, culture is cognitively prior to facts in the sense 
that cultural values shape what individuals believe the conse-
quences of such policies to be. Individuals selectively credit and 
dismiss factual claims in a manner that supports their preferred vi-
sion of a good society. 
The priority of culture to fact is the organizing premise of the 
so-called “cultural theory of risk.”32 Associated most famously with 
the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist 
Aaron Wildavsky,33 the cultural theory of risk links disputes over 
environmental and technological risks to clusters of values that 
form competing cultural worldviews — hierarchic, egalitarian, and 
individualistic. Egalitarians, on this account, are naturally sensitive 
to environmental hazards, the abatement of which justifies regulat-
ing commercial activities that are productive of social inequality. 
Individualists, in contrast, predictably dismiss claims of environ-
mental risk as specious, in line with their commitment to the 
autonomy of markets and other private orderings. Hierarchists are 
similarly skeptical, because they perceive warnings of imminent en-
vironmental catastrophe as threatening the competence of social 
and governmental elites. 
                                                 
 32 See generally Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in Social 
Theories of Risk 83 (Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (de-
scribing the theory and identifying key theoretical contributions to it). 
 33 See Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1982). 
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Although one can imagine alternative explanations for cul-
tural variation in risk perceptions,34 cultural cognition offers a dis-
tinctively psychometric one.35 On this view, the impact of cultural 
worldviews is not an alternative to, but rather a vital component 
of, the various psychological and social mechanisms that have been 
shown to determine perceptions of risk. These mechanisms, cul-
tural cognition asserts, are endogenous to culture. That is, the direc-
tion in which they point risk perceptions depends on individuals’ 
cultural values. 
Consider the “affect heuristic.” Emotional responses to puta-
tively dangerous activities strongly determine risk perceptions,36 
but what determines whether those responses are positive or nega-
tive? The answer, cultural cognition asserts, is culture: persons’ 
worldviews infuse various activities — firearm possession,37 nuclear 
power generation,38 red-meat consumption39 — with despised or 
valued social meanings, which in turn determine whether individu-
als react with anxiety or calmness, dread or admiration, toward 
those activities. This account recognizes, in line with the best psy-
                                                 
 34 Douglas and Wildavsky, for example, suggest a functionalist account in 
which individuals are deemed to form beliefs congenial to their ways of life pre-
cisely because such beliefs promote those ways of life. See Mary Douglas, How 
Institutions Think 31 – 43 (1986); Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis & 
Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory 104 – 07 (1990). 
 35 See generally J. M. Balkin, Cultural Software 9–10, 173–74 (1998) 
(suggesting the need for an account of cultural influences that rests on psycho-
logical mechanisms operating at the individual level). 
 36 See Slovic et al., supra note 26. 
 37 See http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/86/100/ (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2005). 
 38 See Ellen Peters, An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception and Stigma 
Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, and 
Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 Risk Analysis 1349 
(2004). 
 39 See Michael W. Allen & Sik Hung Ng, Human Values, Utilitarian Bene-
fits and Identification: The Case of Meat, 33 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37 (2003). 
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chological accounts, that emotions are not thoughtless surges of 
affect, but rather value-laden judgments shaped by social norms.40 
A similar account can be given of “probability neglect.” Indi-
viduals display less sensitivity to the improbability of a bad outcome 
when that outcome is attended by intensely negative affect. But 
insofar as the valence and strength of individuals’ affective re-
sponses are influenced by their cultural appraisals of putatively 
dangerous activities (guns, nuclear power plants, drug use, casual 
sex, etc.), “probability neglect” will again be culture dependent. 
“Availability,” too, is likely to be endogenous to culture. How 
large they perceive risks to be depends on how readily individuals 
can recall instances of misfortune associated with those risks. But 
how likely someone is to take note of such a misfortune and to re-
call it almost certainly depends on her values: to avoid cognitive 
dissonance, we are likely selectively to attend to information in a 
way that reinforces rather than undermines our commitment to the 
view that certain activities (say, gun possession, or economic com-
merce) are either virtuous or base.41 
Culture will also condition the impact of social influences on 
risk perception. The vast run of individuals are not in a position to 
determine for themselves whether childhood vaccines induce au-
tism, silicone breast implants cause immune dysfunction, private 
firearm possession reduces or increases crime, and so on. Accord-
ingly, they are obliged to trust others to tell them which risk claims, 
supported by which forms of highly technical empirical evidence, to 
believe. And the people they trust, not surprisingly, are the ones 
                                                 
 40 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence 
of Emotions (2001); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Con-
ceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996) (examining 
influence of cognitive conception of emotion in law). 
 
 41 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A 
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291, 1313–15 
(2003); see also Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts 
of Pollution and Taboo 39-40 (1966) (suggesting that cognitive-dissonance 
might cause people to ignore harms by believing others are mistaken). 
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who share their cultural worldviews — and who are likely to be 
disposed to particular positions by virtue of affect, probability ne-
glect, availability and similar mechanisms. Risk perceptions are 
thus likely to be uniform within cultural groups and diverse across 
them. Accordingly, group polarization and cascades are endoge-
nous to culture, too. 
A considerable body of recent empirical research supports this 
account. Using a variety of methods, researchers have demon-
strated the influence of cultural worldviews on perceptions of envi-
ronmental risks, particularly those associated with nuclear power.42 
We have conducted our own “National Risk and Culture Sur-
vey,” designed to establish the influence of cultural cognition on a 
broad scale.43 The study utilized Douglas’s well-known typology, 
which categorizes cultural ways of life along two cross-cutting di-
mensions, “group” and “grid.”44 Within “high group” ways of life, 
individuals “interact frequently and in a wide range of activities” in 
which they must “depend on each other,” a condition that “pro-
motes values of solidarity”; in “low group” ways of life, in contrast, 
individuals are expected to “fend for themselves and therefore tend 
to be competitive.”45 Persons who participate in a “high grid” way 
of life expect resources, opportunities, respect, and the like to be 
                                                 
 42 See, e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An 
Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. Cross-Cultural 
Psychol. 61 (1991); Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical 
Analysis of Nuclear Waste Images of Nevada, in Risk, Media, and Stigma: Un-
derstanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technology 107 
(P.S. James Flynn, and Howard Kunreuther eds., 2001); Ellen Peters & Paul 
Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception 
and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. Applied. Soc. Psychol. 1427, 1445–51 
(1996). 
 43 See National Risk & Culture Survey, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/45/89/ (last visited Sept. 
29, 2005) (providing background explaining how the researchers conducted the 
survey and what the general findings were). 
 44 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology viii 
(1970). 
 45 Rayner, supra note 32, at 87–88. 
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“distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications, 
such as sex, color, . . . holding a bureaucratic office, [or] descent in 
a senior clan or lineage.”46 Those who adhere to a “low grid” way of 
life favor a “state of affairs in which no one is prevented from par-
ticipating in any social role because he or she is the wrong sex, or is 
too old, or does not have the right family connections” and so 
forth.47 After conducting an extensive review of ethnographic ma-
terials, conducting our own focus group discussions, and pretesting 
a wide variety of survey items, we developed two highly reliable at-
titude scales, “Individualism-solidarism” and “Hierarchy-
egalitarianism,” which capture the key value conflicts among per-
sons located in different quadrants of the group/grid typology.48 
In a random national survey of 1800 persons, we used these 
scales to measure the impact of cultural worldviews on a diverse 
array of risk perceptions. Our results confirmed Douglas and Wil-
davsky’s (and other researchers’) conclusions on the relationship 
between cultural worldviews and perceptions of environmental risk. 
The more egalitarian and solidaristic persons become, the more 
concerned they are about global warming, nuclear power, and pol-
lution generally, whereas the more hierarchical and individualistic 
persons become, the less concerned they are.49 
We found a similar relationship between cultural worldviews 
and perceptions of gun-related risks. Relatively egalitarian and soli-
daristic persons believe that widespread private ownership of guns 
undermines public safety by increasing the incidence of crime and 
gun accidents; relatively hierarchical and individualistic persons, by 
contrast, believe that widespread restrictions on private gun owner-
ship undermine public safety by rendering law-abiding persons un-
                                                 
 46 Jonathan L. Gross & Steve Rayner, Measuring Culture : A Para-
digm for the Analysis of Social Organization 6 (1985). 
 47 Rayner, supra note 32, at 87. 
 48 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. 
Mertz, Gender, Race, and Risk Perception 38 – 40 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 86, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762.  
 49 See id. at 15. 
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able to defend themselves from violent predation.50 These opposing 
perceptions of gun risks cohere with the negative and positive so-
cial meanings that guns bear, respectively, for persons of these cul-
tural orientations.51 
Whereas individualists and hierarchists square off against soli-
darists and egalitarians on environmental and gun risks, on other 
issues individualists and hierarchists part ways. Hierarchists worry, 
for example, about the societal dangers of drug distribution, pro-
miscuous sex, and the individual dangers of marijuana smoking; 
individualists do not.52 Likewise, egalitarians and individualists are 
not worried about the personal risks of obtaining an abortion or 
contracting AIDS from surgery; hierarchists worry a great deal 
about these risks.53 These patterns also conform to the logic of the 
worldviews in question: hierarchists morally disapprove of behavior 
that defies conventional norms, and thus naturally believe that de-
viant behavior is dangerous; egalitarians morally disapprove of 
norms that rigidly stratify people, and individualists disapprove of 
norms that constrain individual choice generally, so these types 
naturally believe that deviant behavior is benign. 
B. Cultural Evaluation vs. Rational and Irrational Weighing 
The empirical evidence supporting the phenomenon of cul-
tural cognition generates a distinct model of risk perception. We 
call it the “cultural evaluator” model to emphasize the role that 
cultural values play in determining not only which goods individu-
als are willing to take risks to obtain, but also which empirical 
claims about risk they are likely to believe. 
                                                 
 50 See id. at 18 – 21. 
 51 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 41, at 1299–1302. 
 52 The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Cultural and Politi-
cal Attitudes, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 53 The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Health Risk Per-
ceptions, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/102/100 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2005). 
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This label also underscores what we take to be the descriptive 
inappropriateness of suggesting that individual risk perceptions 
typically embody any sort of expected-utility weighing, rational or 
irrational. Indeed, for most persons, such weighing is completely 
unnecessary: studies show that individuals’ perceptions of the bene-
fits and risks of various putatively dangerous activities (from nu-
clear power to commercial aviation to handgun ownership) are in-
versely correlated.54 Guided by judgment-infused emotions, and 
motivated by their need to preserve their fundamental ties to oth-
ers, individuals naturally conform their perception of both the costs 
and the benefits of such activities to the positive or negative social 
meanings that cultural norms assign to those activities. 
In sum, individuals adopt stances toward risks that express 
their commitment to particular ways of life. Their risk perceptions 
might or might not be accurate when evaluated from an actuarial 
standpoint; policies based on them might or might not be in the 
interest of society measured according to any welfarist metric. Nev-
ertheless, which activities individuals view to be dangerous and 
which policies they view to be effective embody coherent visions of 
the good society and the virtuous life. 
III. Culturally Evaluating Sunstein 
We’ve suggested that Sunstein’s conception of the irrational-
weigher model is inattentive to the phenomenon of cultural cogni-
tion. We now consider how this inattention detracts from Sun-
stein’s diagnosis of the pathologies that afflict risk perceptions and 
his recommended institutional cures. 
A. Descriptive Deficiencies 
Sunstein’s descriptive account of risk perception draws a sharp 
distinction between public risk assessments and expert ones. The 
                                                 
 54 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 404–05 (noting that many people associate 
high benefit actions with low risks, and vice versa); The Cultural Cognition Pro-
ject at Yale Law School, Gun Risk Attitudes, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=vie
w&id=99 (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) (noting the same inverse correlation with 
perceptions of gun risks). 
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former are distorted by various cognitive and social dynamics that 
impel lay persons to fixate obsessively on risks of high emotional 
salience but often minimal consequence, and to disregard more se-
rious threats to societal well-being. The latter, in contrast, are 
characterized by the balance and accuracy associated with the 
calmer and more analytic modes of System II reasoning. 
The cultural evaluator model suggests a richer and more nu-
anced picture that accounts for certain phenomena that Sunstein’s 
irrational-weigher model does not satisfactorily explain. These in-
clude systematic differences in risk perceptions among lay persons; 
the clustering of public risk perceptions across seemingly discrete 
issues; systematic differences of opinion among risk experts; and 
the intensity of political conflict surrounding risk regulation. 
1. Individual Differences. — Lay persons disagree not only with 
experts but also with one another about the magnitude of various 
risks. These disagreements, moreover, are far from random. They 
highly correlate with characteristics such as gender, race, political 
orientation, and religion, and they persist even after controlling for 
education and other information-related influences.55 
These systematic individual differences pose an obvious chal-
lenge to the rational-weigher model of risk perception. The idea 
that individuals respond to risk in a manner that maximizes their 
expected utility certainly allows for heterogeneity in the benefits 
individuals attach to risky activities. But if individuals, in aggregate 
and over time, are rationally processing information about risk, dif-
ferences in their estimations of the magnitude of risky activities 
should essentially just be noise — products of random variation 
that display no intelligible patterns across persons. 
The irrational-weigher model also fails to explain such differ-
ences. It’s implausible to think that men are more or less vulnerable 
than women, whites more or less vulnerable than minorities, Re-
publicans more or less vulnerable than Democrats, or Catholics 
more or less vulnerable than Protestants or Jews to the distorting 
                                                 
 55 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48 (presenting 
data showing influence of various individual characteristics on risk perceptions). 
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influence of “availability,” “probability neglect,” “status quo bias,” 
“affect,” and the like.56 
To his credit, Sunstein’s particular emphasis on social influ-
ences does suggest a reason why risk perceptions might vary cross-
culturally. Even initially “small or random” differences in the distri-
bution of perceptions across space will predictably grow in intensity 
and ultimately become sharply pronounced as a result of “availabil-
ity cascades” and “group polarization” (p. 96): 
Because different social influences can be found in different 
communities, local variations are inevitable, with different exam-
ples becoming salient in each. Hence such variations — between, 
say, New York and Ohio, or England and the United States, or 
between Germany and France — might involve coincidence . . . . 
Indeed the different reactions to nuclear power in France and the 
United States can be explained in large part in this way. And 
when some groups concentrate on cases in which guns increased 
violence, and others on cases in which guns decreased violence, 
availability cascades are a large part of the reason. “Many Ger-
mans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; 
they also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The 
English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some 
cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments.” (p. 96)57 
But as Sunstein’s own description suggests, this type of “cul-
tural” account predicts that group differences should be largely geo-
graphic in nature. If salient or gripping examples of misfortune (as 
well as overrepresented opinions or arguments) spread from one 
person to another within geographic communities — in much the 
same way that an infectious disease does — there would be little 
                                                 
 56 Researchers have explicitly ruled out such differences in the case of 
gender. See, e.g., Charles R. Berger, Eun-Ju Lee & Joel T. Johnson, Gender, Ra-
tionality, and Base-Rate Explanations for Increasing Trends, 30 Comm. Res. 737, 
758 (2003); Stuart J. McKelvie, The Availability Heuristic: Effects of Fame and 
Gender on the Estimated Frequency of Male and Female Names, 137 J. Soc. Psych. 
63 (1997); Craig W. Trumbo, Information Processing and Risk Perception: An Ad-
aptation of the Heuristic-Systematic Model, 52 J. Comm. 367, 379 (2002).  
 57 The author quotes Joseph Heinrich et al., Group Report: What is the Role 
of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive 
Toolbox 343, 353 (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001). 
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reason to expect Jews, African Americans, and women in New 
York to be more like Jews, African Americans, and women in Ohio 
than they are like Protestants, whites, and men in New York. But 
in fact religious, racial, and gender effects persist even when region 
is controlled for. 
Of course, random variations within other, non-geographic 
communities — professional or occupational ones, for example, or 
perhaps internet “discussion groups” comprising persons with com-
mon vocational or political interests — might also blossom into sys-
tematic differences in risk perception as individuals within those 
communities interact. But it’s necessary to resort to fairly complex 
and largely ad hoc conjectures to link differences of these sorts to 
the well defined forms of variation we actually see across social 
groups. 
The cultural evaluator model, in contrast, suggests a coherent 
and parsimonious explanation for such variation. That model ex-
plicitly posits that risk perceptions will vary across persons in pat-
terns that reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews. Gender, 
ethnicity, religion, political orientation and like characteristics cor-
relate with such outlooks.58 It follows that cultural variation in risk 
perception will manifest itself in systematic differences in risk per-
ception across different social groups. 
The results of our own National Risk and Culture Survey con-
firm this conclusion. Consistent with previous research, we found 
that factors such as income, education, community type (rural or 
                                                 
 58 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48, at 6–7. For 
this reason, these and similar demographic characteristics are commonly used as 
proxies for distinctive cultural norms. See, e.g., Raymond D. Gastil, Cultural 
Regions of the United States (1975) (charting regional correlates with cultural 
values); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development (1982) (using gender as indicator of commitment to 
compatible moral sensibilities); Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen, Culture of 
Honor 1 – 2 (1996) (using region of residence as representative of a shared cul-
tural and psychological background); Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the 
Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel Application of the General Social 
Surveys, 39 Am. Behav. Scientist. 387 (1996) (using race, class, gender, and 
region as proxies for cultural norms). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Afraid of Democracy 27 
 
   
 
 
 
urban), political ideology, and personality type do predict various 
risk perceptions. But we also found that cultural worldviews exert 
significantly and substantially more predictive power than these 
characteristics. Seemingly significant gender and race variances in 
risk perception also turn out to be an artifact of culture-specific dif-
ferences in risk perception related to gender and race differences in 
social roles relating to putatively dangerous activities within hierar-
chic and (to a lesser extent) individualist ways of life.59 
Indeed, even the sorts of geographic variations that Sunstein 
focuses on are best understood as reflecting variance in cultural 
commitments over space. The difference between French and U.S. 
attitudes toward nuclear power, and the resulting differences in the 
regulatory postures of the two nations, are hardly a matter of “coin-
cidence” or chance. In contrast to members of the public in the 
United States, members of the public in France are much more 
likely to hold a hierarchical worldview.60 This difference not only 
disposes the French to be more accepting of nuclear power risks, 
but also to be more confident in the ability of technical and gov-
ernmental elites to manage any such risks.61 
In other words, membership in various social groups (including 
sometimes entire nations) predicts risk perceptions only because 
those groups are proxies for culture. Moreover, because they are 
only proxies, their unique influence fades to insignificance in a 
model that directly accounts for cultural worldviews. 
2. Belief Clustering. — Risk perceptions not only vary system-
atically across social groups; they also cohere across seemingly dis-
crete issues. How likely one is to perceive global warming to be a 
threat, for example, predicts how much one worries about gun acci-
                                                 
 59 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48, at 16–18. 
 60 See Paul Slovic, James Flynn, C.K. Mertz, Marc Poumadere & Claire 
Mays, Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in 
France and the United States, in Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies 93-94 (O. Renn and B. Rohrmann eds., 2000). 
 61 See id. at 87–89, 90, 93–94, 98. 
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dents, which in turn tells us whether one regards abortion as a dan-
gerous medical procedure, and marijuana as a dangerous drug.62 
This feature of public risk perceptions also defies the conven-
tional models. Because as an empirical matter nothing about the 
size of any one of these risks entails anything about the size of any 
other, we wouldn’t expect persons behaving like rational weighers 
to divide into opposing groups on these matters. Nor is it at all 
clear why persons behaving like irrational weighers would form 
these particular packages of risk perceptions. Nothing in the rela-
tive salience, familiarity, or evocative imagery of any one of these 
risks is connected in any logical or practical way to those features of 
the others. There’s also nothing intrinsic to Sunstein’s irrational-
weigher model that should lead us to expect those who do or don’t 
take seriously one of these risks (say, of global warming or of mari-
juana use) to be any more likely to exchange information with oth-
ers who do or don’t take seriously some other risk (say, of gun acci-
dents or of health complications from abortion). 
The cultural evaluator model, in contrast, readily explains be-
lief clustering. The meanings of these diverse risks — the values ex-
pressed by the activities that give rise to the risks, and by govern-
ment regulation of the same — might cohere in perfectly sensible 
ways. The idea that guns are dangerous and worthy of regulation, 
for example, threatens hierarchical roles and denigrates individual-
ist virtues; the threat of global warming impugns the competence of 
hierarchical elites and invites interference with markets and other 
forms of private orderings that individualists prize. It is therefore 
perfectly sensible to expect hierarchists and individualists to believe 
both that guns are not dangerous and global warming is not a seri-
ous threat, and for egalitarians and solidarists to believe otherwise. 
Our data found this very pattern, and others that reflect the ex-
pressive coherence of these opposing worldviews.63 
                                                 
 62 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48, at 24–28..  
 63 See supra text at notes 49–52. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald 
Braman, The Cultural Cognition of Public Policy Yale L. & Pub. Policy Rev. 
(forthcoming 2005). 
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3. Experts. — Sunstein’s account seeks to identify the mecha-
nisms that impel members of the public wildly to overestimate the 
importance of risks that experts view with much less concern. But 
experts themselves are hardly of one mind about societal risks. 
Nearly every public belief cited by Sunstein as a product of some 
public “risk panic” — that nuclear power is dangerous, that arsenic 
in drinking water poses a health threat, that “mad cow” disease is a 
serious concern — is shared by some scientists and rejected by oth-
ers.64  
Expert disagreement per se does not necessarily defy Sunstein’s 
account. The empirical evidence surrounding many important so-
cietal risks is often conflicting and in some instances very scant. 
Employing the methodical and dispassionate forms of analysis asso-
ciated with System II reasoning, experts could well come to differ-
ent conclusions in these circumstances. 
The problem, however, is that the nature of expert disagree-
ment belies this account of its causes. As is true of disagreement 
among members of the public generally, disagreements among risk 
experts are distributed in patterns that cannot plausibly be linked 
either to access to information or capacity to understand it. Gen-
                                                 
 64 On nuclear power, see Nuclear Power: Both Sides (Michio Kaku & 
Jennifer Trainer, eds., 1992). On arsenic, compare National Research Council 
Committee on Toxicology, Arsenic in Drinking Water: 2001 Update 214 
(2001) (concluding based on epidemiological studies that arsenic exposure 
within existing regulatory standards might significantly increase cancer risk) with 
M.N. Bates, A.H. Smith, & K.P. Cantor, Case-Control Study of Bladder Cancer 
and Arsenic in Drinking Water, 141 Am. J. Epidemiology 523 (1995) (concluding 
that cities with levels of drinking water arsenic below and above existing stan-
dards do not differ in incidence of cancer). On mad cow disease, compare Top 
Scientist: Test All Cows for Mad Cow Disease, UPI Newsire, Mar. 17, 2004 (re-
porting view of Nobel Prize-winning scientist who discovered mad cow infectious 
agent that the disease is “the greatest threat to the safety of the human food sup-
ply in modern times”) with Joshua T. Cohen et al., Evaluation of the Potential for 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (October 2003), available at 
http://www.hcra.harvard.edu/pdf/madcow.pdf (“[E]ven if BSE were somehow to 
arise in the U.S., few additional animals would become infected, little infectivity 
would be available for potential human exposure, and the disease would be 
eradicated. In short, the U.S. appears very resistant to a BSE challenge . . . .”). 
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der, for example, predicts systematic differences in risk perception 
among experts,65 as do political ideology and institutional affiliation 
(academic vs. industrial).66 Because these sorts of characteristics 
are all plausible proxies for cultural orientation, variance along 
these lines suggests that cultural cognition is figuring in expert 
judgments of risk, too. Research that one of us has conducted (in-
dependent of the National Risk and Culture Survey) supports ex-
actly this conclusion.67 
There are at least two possible ways in which cultural cogni-
tion could be exerting this impact on expert risk assessments. One 
is that cultural worldviews might induce experts, like members of 
the public generally, to engage in heuristic or System I forms of rea-
soning pervaded by biases such as availability and probability ne-
glect. 
But a second and even more plausible explanation is that cul-
tural worldviews are biasing the more reflective System II forms of 
reasoning associated with expert judgment. Sunstein maintains 
that System II reasoning is “more likely to be error free” because it 
is “more deliberative [and] calculative” (p. 68). But a wealth of re-
search on dual-process reasoning suggests that the truth is much 
more complicated. System II often furnishes less reliable guidance 
than heuristic-driven System I reasoning.68 Among the reasons this 
                                                 
 65 See, e.g., Richard P. Barke, Hank Jenkins-Smith, & Paul Slovic, Risk 
Perceptions of Men and Women Scientists, 78 Social Science Quarterly 167, 172–
75 (1997).  
 66  See Slovic, supra note 10, at 286, 311–12. 
 67 See id. at 406–09 (describing studies in which cultural worldviews ex-
plained variance among scientists). Douglas Kysar and James Salzman convinc-
ingly attribute expert as well as public disagreement over risk to conflicting 
worldviews in Environmental Tribalism, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1099, 1111 – 16 
(2003). 
 68 See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 26, at 320 (noting that expert chess 
players and mathematicians perform better when relying on tacit or heuristic 
rather than purely analytic reasoning and arguing that “risk as feeling may out-
perform risk as analysis” in settings such as security screening at airports). 
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is so is the vulnerability of even System II reasoning to various bias-
ing influences.69 
One such influence is known as defense motivation.70 Informa-
tion that challenges beliefs essential to one’s group identity is 
known to pose a threat to individuals’ perceptions of their status. 
To repel that threat, individuals (subconsciously) screen arguments 
and evidence in a way protective of their existing beliefs. Such 
screening, it has been shown, operates whether individuals are en-
gaged in either heuristic reasoning or more reflective reasoning.71 In 
effect, defense motivation biases individuals’ use of System II rea-
soning, causing them to use deliberate, calculating, and methodical 
analysis to support beliefs dominant within their group and to de-
bunk challenges to those beliefs.72 
This is most likely the dynamic that generates group-based dis-
agreement among risk experts. Like members of the general public, 
experts are inclined to form attitudes toward risk that best express 
their cultural visions. The only difference, if any, is that experts are 
more likely to use System II reasoning to do so. 
4. Politics. — Highly charged disputes occupy a conspicuous 
position in our society’s political life. How (if at all) to respond to 
global warming, whether to enact or repeal gun control laws, what 
                                                 
 69 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing 
Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, 
and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 460 
(1994); Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuris-
tic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. Inquiry 44 (1999). 
 70 See Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and 
Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
Bull. 84, 85 (1997). 
 71 See id. at 85–86; see also Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The 
Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 808 (2003) (finding that experimental subjects using systematic reason-
ing are still disposed to credit arguments conditional on sharing a group alle-
giance with the source of the arguments). 
 72 See Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated 
Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. Inq. 44, 45 (1999). 
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sorts of policies to adopt to combat domestic terrorism, and like 
issues generate intense public conflict. The power to explain the 
prevalence of intense conflict over risk regulation is another advan-
tage of the cultural evaluator model over Sunstein’s irrational 
weigher model. 
To be sure, the centrality of risk regulation in democratic poli-
tics is perfectly compatible with Sunstein’s position. Many risk 
regulation issues are of obvious consequence to the well-being of 
society. Moreover, because such issues usually involve highly grip-
ping and evocative instances of harm, they predictably trigger a 
self-reinforcing wave of public anxiety to which democratically ac-
countable institutions inevitably react (indeed, overreact).73 
What confounds Sunstein’s account, however, is the highly 
conflictual nature of risk regulation politics. If public attention were 
being driven solely by mechanisms like availability, probability ne-
glect, cascades, and group polarization, we would expect members 
of the public and democratically accountable government officials 
to be uniformly impelled toward increasingly restrictive forms of 
regulation of the sort counseled by the “precautionary principle.” 
This is exactly the sort of story, in fact, that Stephen Breyer, Sun-
stein’s irrational-weigher comrade in arms, tells about the regula-
tory process.74 But the truth is that risk regulation politics are not 
nearly so one-sided. Public demand for regulatory responses to 
global warming, gun accidents, terrorism, and similar sources of risk 
generates equally intense public opposition to the same. 
This is exactly the state of affairs one would predict under the 
cultural evaluator model. As a result of cultural cognition, indi-
viduals of diverse cultural persuasions are endowed with competing 
affective responses toward putatively dangerous activities, and are 
thus impelled to adopt opposing stances on risk issues. 
The cultural evaluator model not only explains why risk regu-
lation politics are conflictual, but also why those on both sides ad-
                                                 
 73 See text at notes 26–27. 
 74 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 33 – 51.  
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vance their positions with such intensity. Sociologist Joseph Gus-
field describes as symbolic “status conflicts” political disputes in 
which the adherents of opposing cultural styles compete for es-
teem.75 In such struggles, opposing cultural groups mobilize to en-
act legislation that “glorifies the values of one group and demeans 
those of another,” thereby “enhanc[ing] the social status of. . . the 
affirmed culture” at the expense of the one “condemned as devi-
ant.”76 Because individuals care as much about their status as they 
do about their material welfare, “[t]he struggle to control the sym-
bolic actions of government is often as bitter and fateful as the 
struggle to control its tangible effects.”77 Important historical ex-
amples include battles over temperance and civil rights;78 contem-
porary examples include the ongoing battles over capital punish-
ment,79 gay rights,80 and hate crime laws.81 
Disputes over risk regulation fit this pattern. Because they 
evocatively symbolize the worldviews of hierarchists and egalitari-
ans, individualists and solidarists, regulations of drugs, guns, sexual 
promiscuity, and other putatively dangerous activities inevitably 
come to signify whose stock is up and whose down in the incessant 
competition for social esteem. What seem like highly technical and 
often highly uncertain empirical disputes among experts galvanize 
                                                 
 75 Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the 
American Temperance Movement, 21 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Gusfield, 
Symbolic Crusade]; Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic 
Process of Designating Deviance, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 54 (1968) [hereinafter Gusfield, 
Designating Deviance]. 
 76 Gusfield, Designating Deviance, supra note 75, at 57–59. 
 77 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, supra note 75, at 167. 
 78 See Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, supra note 75, at 22–24. 
 79 See, e.g., Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exer-
cise in Symbolic Politics, 5 L. & Pol. Q. 157 (1983). 
 80 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts 
Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 Yale L.J. 1279, 
1289–92 (2005). 
 81 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. 
Rev. 413, 463–67 (1999). 
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the public because they are in truth the “the product of an ongoing 
debate about the ideal society.”82 
B. Normative/Prescriptive Deficiencies 
Although Sunstein purports to be reconciling risk regulation 
with “deliberative democracy,” his proposed regulatory reforms are 
neither particularly deliberative nor particularly democratic. Sun-
stein’s central prescription is to redirect risk regulation from “highly 
representative institutions” to “more insulated” experts (p. 126). 
Rather than try to inject scientifically sound information into pub-
lic discourse, government officials should endeavor to “[c]hange the 
subject” — “to discuss something else” (p. 125) in order to divert 
public attention away from “facts that will predictably cause high 
levels of alarm” (p. 123). The cultural evaluator model supports an 
approach to risk regulation that is much more consistent with par-
ticipatory and deliberative visions of democracy. 
1. Information and Cultural Identity Affirmation. — To start, 
Sunstein is likely far too pessimistic about the possibility of public 
education. Sunstein’s preference for distracting rather than educat-
ing the public reflects his assumption that ordinary citizens lack the 
time and capacity to process information through reflective System 
II forms of reasoning as opposed to heuristic-driven System I ones. 
As we have emphasized, Sunstein overstates the accuracy of Sys-
tem II reasoning relative to System I.83 But even more important, 
because he fails to perceive the endogeneity of risk-perception 
mechanisms to culture, Sunstein overlooks the possibility of risk-
communication techniques that make System II reasoning itself 
responsive to scientifically sound information. 
The best work in dual-process reasoning supports the conclu-
sion that individuals are motivated by a form of status anxiety to 
resist information that portends regulatory action denigrating of 
their cultural values.84 It follows that individuals can be made more 
                                                 
 82 Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 33, at 36. 
 83 See text at notes 68–72. 
 84 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48. 
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receptive to such information when it is communicated to them in 
forms that affirm their status. Research by social psychologists 
Geoffrey Cohen, Joshua Aronson, and Claude Steele, for example, 
shows that individuals are much more willing to change their 
minds on charged issues like the death penalty and abortion when 
they are first exposed to self-affirming information, such as their 
high performance on a test or their possession of some desirable 
personal attribute.85 Self-affirmation of this sort buffers the threat 
to self that otherwise motivates individuals to resist acceptance of 
information at odds with beliefs dominant within their identity-
defining group.86 
There is a political analog of this self-affirmation effect. It in-
volves affirming the selves of those who might resist information 
about a societal danger by tying that information to a proposed pol-
icy solution that itself affirms the resisters’ cultural commitments. 
For a plausible historical example, consider the softening of 
conservative opposition to air pollution regulation in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Individualists tend to resist the idea that com-
merce threatens the environment, because that conclusion implies 
that society ought to constrain market behavior and like forms of 
private ordering. Yet when the idea of tradable emission permits — 
a market solution to the problem of air pollution — was devised 
during the highly individualist Bush I Administration,87 pro-market 
                                                 
 85 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When 
Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 Per-
sonality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1151 (2000). 
 86 See id. See generally David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting 
Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 
Current Directions in Psychol. Sci. 119 (2002). See also Geoffrey L. Cohen, 
David K. Sherman, Michelle McGoey, Lillian Hsu, Anthony Bastardi & Lee 
Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-
Mindedness and Inflexibility (Sept. 10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/cohen_self_affirmation_dra
ft.pdf.  
 87 See Project 88, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environ-
ment: Initiatives for the New President 26 – 29 (Timothy E. Wirth & John 
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forces in the Republican Party stopped resisting. Shown a solution 
that affirmed their cultural values, it became easier, cognitively, for 
individualists to accept the idea that there was a problem to be 
dealt with after all. Hierarchists, who tend to resist claims of envi-
ronmental danger as implicit criticisms of social elites, also likely 
felt affirmed by a policy that promised to improve air quality by 
empowering rather than constraining commercial firms.88 
For a contemporary example, consider the global warming 
controversy. The assertion of this risk is also seen by individualists 
as threatening the autonomy of markets and by hierarchists as im-
pugning the competence of social and governmental elites. Conse-
quently, both downplay the threat posed by global warming (or its 
very existence). But recently, groups of varying ideologies have 
started to tout renewed investment in nuclear power as a way to 
reduce the fossil fuel emissions primarily responsible for global 
warming.89 The self-affirmation effect described by Cohen and his 
collaborators suggests why this strategy might work. Individualists 
and hierarchists both support nuclear power, which is emblematic 
of the very cultural values that are threatened by society’s recogni-
tion of the global warming threat. Shown a solution that affirms 
their identities, individualists and hierarchists can be expected to 
                                                                                                             
Heinz sponsors) (1988); Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand 
Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 69, 76 
(1998). 
 88 Although the policy was initially proposed by environmentalists who 
broke with the conventional egalitarian and solidaristic fear of using market 
mechanisms to induce risk abatement, see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard 
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 
13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 171, 178 – 88 (1988), Bush seized on this approach to 
deflect Democratic Party attacks on his commitment to the environment with-
out alienating his conservative, pro-business base. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert 
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old 
Idea? 18 Ecology L.Q. 1, 28 (1991); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Student Article, Emissions 
Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental 
Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 352, 363–64 (1999). 
 89 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, Nukes Are Green, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 
2005, at A19; Craig Gilbert, Cheney argues case for nuclear plants, Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, June 14, 2001, at 16A. 
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display less resistance — not just politically, but cognitively — to 
the proposition that global warming is a problem after all. 
Indeed, when egalitarians and solidarists are exposed to the 
message that nuclear power can reduce global warming, they are 
likely to perceive nuclear power to be less dangerous. The affirma-
tion of their identity associated with recognition of the global 
warming threat reduces a cognitive impediment to accepting in-
formation that they have long resisted about nuclear safety. 
In these examples, we have assumed scientific consensus that 
both air pollution and global warming are serious environmental 
threats and that nuclear power is reasonably safe. But in conditions 
of scientific uncertainty, the same strategy of cultural-identity af-
firmation could be used to make a culturally diverse public recep-
tive to whatever empirical information might eventually emerge in 
support of policies that advance society’s shared interests. Com-
parative law scholar Mary Ann Glendon, for example, discusses an 
abortion law in France that simultaneously affirmed the identity of 
hierarchists, by permitting abortion not on demand but only in cir-
cumstances of “personal emergency,” and the identity of egalitari-
ans and individualists, by treating an individual woman’s declara-
tion of personal emergency as effectively unreviewable by govern-
ment officials.90 According to Glendon, this legislation dissipated 
cultural conflict and created a climate in which both sides came to 
accept previously disputed factual information about the efficacy of 
certain social welfare policies in reducing demand for abortion.91 
We can imagine a similar strategy to promote receptivity to 
sound information on gun risks. Egalitarians and solidarists focus 
on the risk that too little gun control will increase the incidence of 
gun accidents and crimes, hierarchists and individualists on the risk 
that too much will render law-abiding persons unable to defend 
themselves from criminal predation.92 We will assume that the 
                                                 
 90 See Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 15 
(1987). 
 91 See id. at 15 – 20. 
 92 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48. 
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state of the empirical evidence — which is voluminous and con-
flicting93 — does not now support a confident conclusion either 
way. Nevertheless, a policy those on both sides might accept is a 
“bounty,” in the form of a tax rebate or other monetary reward, for 
individuals who register handguns. 
A “registration bounty” would affirm the cultural identities of 
both control supporters and control opponents simultaneously be-
cause both could see it as an effective and fair solution to a collec-
tive action problem, albeit a different one for each group. For con-
trol supporters, the relevant public good is the reduction of gun 
crime; registration contributes to that good by making it easier to 
trace the ownership of weapons used to commit crimes. Consistent 
with egalitarian and solidarist sensibilities, control supporters can 
thus envision the bounty as a means of equitably compensating in-
dividuals for being made to bear a burden that benefits society at 
large. For control opponents, in contrast, the relevant public good 
is the reduction of violent crime in a community in which a rela-
tively high proportion of individuals own guns. Because they do not 
believe individuals should be expected to endure disproportionate 
burdens to benefit society at large, individualists will think it is per-
fectly appropriate to compensate individual gun owners for the 
contribution they are making to public safety generally. So will 
hierarchists, who can see the bounty as a fitting public acknowl-
edgement of the virtuous willingness of gun owners to promote the 
common good.94 
Agreement of any sort might be viewed as a step forward in 
the American gun policy stalemate. But the real payoff is opening 
the public’s mind to facts. Any policy that affirms the identities of 
                                                 
 93 Compare, e.g., John R. Lott Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understand-
ing Crime and Gun-Control Laws (2d ed. 2000), with Ian Ayres & John J. 
Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1193 (2003). 
 94 For an elaboration of this proposal and others aimed at resolving the 
cultural impasse over guns in American society, see Donald Braman & Dan M. 
Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cul-
tural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
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culturally diverse citizens simultaneously makes all of them more 
receptive to information that they might otherwise have found 
lacking in credibility. Accordingly, the lesson for risk communica-
tors isn’t that they have to “change the subject” so much as change 
the discourse to make new empirical findings compatible with a 
plurality of worldviews. 
2. Cultural Cognition and Deliberative Debiasing. -— In Sun-
stein’s view, any attempt to undertake such public discussions 
would lead inexorably to mass polarization, with preexisting biases 
amplifying themselves in the echo chamber of mass media or even 
the confines of a face-to-face discussion. Such a result might occur, 
but to say it is inevitable underestimates people’s discursive capaci-
ties, and as a result misses the potential they have to counteract the 
biasing effects of cultural cognition. 
Research on the polarizing effect of deliberation on political 
decisionmaking is actually quite mixed. Indeed, a formidable body 
of empirical research also shows that deliberation at least some-
times generates convergence and moderation of opinion.95 Group-
communication researchers have cataloged various procedures that 
help to ameliorate polarization.96 In many political decisionmaking 
                                                 
 95 See John Gastil, Laura Black & Kara Moscovitz, Group and Individual 
Differences in Deliberative Experience: A Study of Ideology, Attitude Change, and 
Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face Groups, Pol. Comm. (forthcoming 2006); Alan 
Gerber & Donald Green, Misperceptions About Perceptual Bias, 2 Ann. Rev. Pol. 
Sci. 189 (1999); Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, 
Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psychol. Rev. 687 
(1996); Choon-Ling Sia, Bernard C.Y. Tan, and Kwok-Kee Wei, Group Polariza-
tion and Computer-Mediated Communication: Effects of Communication Cues, Social 
Presence, and Anonymity, 13 Info. Sys. Res. 70 (2002). 
 96 For detailed descriptions of such procedures, see Ned Crosby & Doug 
Nethercut, Citizens Juries: Creating a Trustworthy Voice of the People,” in The De-
liberative Democracy Handbook 112 – 15 (John Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 
2005); James Fishkin & Cynthia Farrar, Deliberative Polling: From Experiment to 
Community Resource, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra, at 72–
75; Carolyn M. Hendriks, Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells: Lay Citizen 
Deliberations, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra, at 83–89; 
Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer, Joe Goldman & Steven Brigham, A Town Meeting for 
the Twenty-First Century, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra, at 
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contexts, such procedures have been used to promote successful 
deliberative solutions on many issues that are culturally fraught.97 
These procedures work, in part, because they help to dissipate 
the potential of cultural cognition to generate conflict. First, care-
fully structured deliberation does sometimes appear to enable indi-
viduals to engage in a culturally debiased form of System II reason-
ing.98 Political scientist James Fishkin has developed deliberative 
processes, such as the Deliberative Poll, that use expert moderators 
whose intervention appears at least sometimes to induce citizens to 
change their minds on contested issues of fact.99 The Twenty-First 
Century Town Meeting, a deliberative format designed by Carolyn 
Lukensmeyer, uses similar techniques and has generated similar 
results.100 
Deliberation might also sometimes improve public information 
processing by forging a shared civic identity alternative to individu-
                                                                                                             
157–60; Harris Sokoloff, Harris M. Steinberg & Steven N. Pyser, Deliberative 
City Planning on the Philadelphia Waterfront, in The Deliberative Democracy 
Handbook, supra, at 187–91. See generally John Gastil, By Popular Demand 
165–71 (2000) (proposing techniques for counteracting conformity pressure, low 
motivation, and information deficits). 
 97 See W. Barnett Pearce & Stephen W. Littlejohn, Moral Conflict: 
When Social Worlds Collide (1997); Norman Dale, Cross-Cultural Community-
Based Planning: Negotiating the Future of Haida Gwaii (British Columbia), in The 
Consensus Building Handbook, supra, at 923; John Forester, Dealing with Deep 
Value Differences, in The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive 
Guide to Reaching Agreement 463 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan & 
Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999); Christopher Winship, Policy Analysis as 
Puzzle-Solving, in Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Michael Moran, Robert 
E. Goodin and Martin Rein eds., 2006). 
 98 See John Gastil & James P. Dillard, Increasing Political Sophistication 
Through Public Deliberation, 16 Pol. Comm. 3, 19–21 (1999). 
 99 See Fishkin & Farrar, supra note 96, at 72–75. See generally Bruce Ac-
kerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day 44–59 (2004); James S. Fish-
kin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform 
(1991).  
 100 See Lukensmeyer, Goldman & Brigham, supra note 96, at 157–60. 
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als’ cultural affiliations.101 Individuals tend to find the members of 
any in-group more credible than the members of any out-group.102 
The evidence we have collected on culture and risk suggests that 
cultural affinity is the dominant in-group when individuals appraise 
risk. But as they engage one another in earnest face-to-face delib-
eration, individuals committed to resolving an important common 
problem typically form strong emotional bonds.103 It’s plausible to 
imagine that these connections generate a group identity that, for 
the period of deliberation at least, displaces cultural affiliations as 
individuals’ dominant reference point. If so, we might expect indi-
viduals, while they are deliberating together, to experience relief 
from the sense of threat to self that makes them resist information 
at odds with their culturally grounded prior beliefs. This effect 
could explain the consensus that some researchers and practitio-
ners report among participants in deliberation experiments.104 
                                                 
 101 See Stephanie Burkhalter, John Gastil & Todd Kelshaw, A Conceptual 
Definition and Theoretical Model of Public Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face 
Groups, 12 Comm. Theory 398, 415–16 (2002). 
 102 See, e.g., Russell D. Clark, III & Anne Maass, The Role of Social Cate-
gorization and Perceived Source Credibility in Minority Influence, 18 Eur. J. Soc. 
Psychol. 381, 388–92 (1988); Diane M. Mackie, Leila T. Worth & Arlene G. 
Asuncion, Processing of Persuasive In-Group Messages, 58 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 812, 820–21 (1990). 
 103 See, e.g., Pearce & Littlejohn, supra note 97, at 151 – 67; Fishkin & 
Farrar, supra note 96, at 68 – 70; Keith Melville, Taylor L. Willingham & John 
R. Dedrick, National Issues Forums: A Network of Communities Promoting Public 
Deliberation, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra note 96, at 37, 
37–39, 45–51. 
 104 Consider one real-world experiment, the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly on Electoral Reform, which resulted in a 146 – 7 final vote. The Citi-
zens’ Assembly was made up of 160 randomly-selected citizens, one man and one 
woman from each electoral district plus two at-large Aboriginal members. The 
Assembly voted to replace the existing electoral system with a Single Transfer-
able Vote model, which lets voters rank candidates. The Assembly’s plan 
emerged from months of face-to-face deliberation and hearings, which are acces-
sible online. Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, 
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
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Finally, deliberation has the potential to alter individuals’ un-
derstandings of the relationship between their cultural affiliations 
and particular beliefs. On this view, what individuals learn in the 
course of deliberation isn’t so much new information about the 
facts being debated but rather new information about the identities 
of those who hold particular factual beliefs. If participants come to 
see either that a particular belief is less dominant among their cul-
tural peers than they had imagined or that cultural peers who devi-
ate from the dominant belief are not censured as severely as they 
had anticipated, participants are likely to revise their view about 
the social cost — or more accurately the social meaning105 — of 
changing their mind. 
This conjecture is supported by a number of other recognized 
psychological processes. One is the false consensus effect, which re-
fers to the tendency of individuals to form an exaggerated sense of 
the degree to which members of their referent group hold a particu-
lar position.106 This bias is likely to generate a self-sustaining condi-
tion of pluralistic ignorance to the extent that individuals are moti-
vated to represent their adherence of this belief to others, who will 
in turn feel constrained to represent that they hold the belief, not-
withstanding widespread reservations.107 Deliberation might con-
ceivably break this cycle of shared misunderstanding if, contrary to 
expectations, individuals discover that others who share their 
group identity do not in fact uniformly hold the belief in ques-
tion.108 As they revise downward their estimation of how prevalent 
the view is within their group, individuals will feel less threatened 
                                                 
 105 See Cohen, supra note 71. 
 106 See, e.g., George A. Quattrone & Edward E. Jones, The Perception of 
Variability Within In-Groups and Out-Groups: Implications for the Law of Small 
Numbers, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 141, 149–51 (1980). 
 107 See, e.g., Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance 
and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm, 
64 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 243, 244 (1993). 
 108 Cf. David Matza, Delinquency and Drift 52–55 (1964) (suggesting 
this process as one of the mechanisms that steers delinquent youths toward law-
abiding behavior over time). 
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by, and thus become more receptive to, information at odds with 
their prior culturally grounded belief.109 
Although it is admittedly speculative, this account of how de-
liberation can ameliorate the distorting influence of cultural cogni-
tion is nonetheless supported by one real-world approach to risk 
management. Social psychologist Robin Gregory has devised delib-
erative procedures aimed at generating “science-based, community-
supported” environmental risk policies.110 In what he calls “struc-
tured, value-focused” decisionmaking, interested parties from the 
affected community first deliberate on ends in a manner that ex-
poses rather than suppresses their underlying values. Expert risk 
analysts and trained facilitators then join the discussion to help the 
stakeholders to identify courses of action that reconcile various 
combinations of values and to evaluate the costs (fiscal and envi-
ronmental) of those options.111 Gregory presents empirical evi-
dence showing that this approach generates outcomes that are 
more consensual and more defensible from a scientific standpoint 
than either unguided “bottom-up” approaches to regulation or 
highly centralized and insulated “top-down” ones.112 
                                                 
 109 See Cohen, supra note 71. 
 110 Robin Gregory & Katharine Wellman, Bringing Stakeholder Values into 
Environmental Policy Choices: A Community-Based Estuary Case Study, 39 Eco-
logical Econ. 37, 38 (2001). 
 111 See Robin Gregory, Tim McDaniels & Daryl Fields, Decision Aiding, 
Not Dispute Resolution: Creating Insights Through Structured Environmental Deci-
sions, 20 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 415, 419–26 (2001); Robin Gregory & 
Timothy McDaniels, Improving Environmental Decision Processes, in Nat’l Re-
search Council, Decision Making for the Environment: Social and Behav-
ioral Science Research Priorities 175, 187–91 (2005); Robin S. Gregory, Incor-
porating Value Trade-Offs into Community-Based Environmental Risk Decisions, 11 
Envtl. Values 461, 472–84 (2002); Robin Gregory & Lee Failing, Using Decision 
Analysis to Encourage Sound Deliberation: Water Use Planning in British Columbia, 
Canada, 21 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 492, 493–96 (2002); Robin Gregory, Jo-
seph Arvai & Tim McDaniels, Value-Focused Thinking for Environmental Risk 
Consultations, 9 Soc. Probs. & Pub. Pol’y 249, 255–62 (2001). 
 112 See, e.g., Gregory & Wellman, supra note 110, at 43–51 (describing 
an experiment using structured, value-focused deliberation on the impact of de-
velopment on a local estuary); Gregory, Arvai & McDaniels, supra note 111, at 
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Structured, value-focused deliberation of this sort is likely to 
engage all of the cultural cognition “debiasing” mechanisms we 
have identified. Having been candidly exposed to the values of 
their fellow citizens, participating individuals are likely to form a 
more realistic and less antagonistic picture of how positions are dis-
tributed among their neighbors. Armed with expert information 
and assisted by mediators, they are likely to engage in more sophis-
ticated appraisals of the costs and benefits of the regulatory options 
available. And because the matter is being resolved not by remote 
agencies or administrators, but by them in a context in which ex-
perts engage them face-to-face, participants are likely to form trust-
inducing emotional bonds that free them from the need to rely en-
tirely on cultural affinities in assessing the credibility of information 
sources. 
Indeed, the generation of culture-independent forms of trust, 
particularly between lay persons and risk experts, is likely the most 
valuable feature of genuinely democratic policymaking. The design 
and implementation of policies for managing toxic waste disposal, 
nuclear power generation, and other societal risks inevitably de-
mands substantial reliance on remote expert regulators. Because 
members of the public know that their fate is in the experts’ hands, 
as it were, risk experts can count on enduring political support for 
their decisions only if members of the public trust them. And one 
of the most important conditions of such trust, research shows, is 
the perception that officials have consulted and are responsive to 
affected members of the public.113 
The relationship between trust and deliberation ought to make 
even those who share Sunstein’s confidence in experts wary of 
granting them the political insulation he and other irrational-
weigher theorists advocate. Just as consultation breeds trust in ex-
pert risk regulators, so too the perception that such officials are re-
mote and unaccountable erodes it.114 Ironically, then, the greater 
                                                                                                             
263–71 (describing an experiment involving deliberation over risks associated 
with a hydroelectric power plant). 
 113 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 316–19, 322. 
 114 See id. at 322–23, 409–10. 
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the degree of political insulation the law affords to expert regula-
tors, the less likely it is that popularly responsive institutions of 
government will invest those regulators with power to begin with or 
respect their decisions as final. 
3. Culture and Expert Cost-Benefit Analysis. — We have sug-
gested that Sunstein overstates the intractability of error in public 
risk perceptions. But even if we are wrong, the cultural evaluator 
model strongly critiques the antidemocratic nature of Sunstein’s 
program. Bringing the role of cultural cognition into view severely 
undermines the foundation for Sunstein’s refusal to afford norma-
tive significance to public risk evaluations generally. 
As we have noted, Sunstein advocates delegating a sizeable 
amount of discretion to politically insulated risk specialists. The 
basis for this prescription is his normative assumption that the dif-
ferences between lay assessments of risk and expert ones are the 
product not of “rival rationalities” but simple errors on the part of 
the public, generated by myriad social psychological pathologies (p. 
86). Accordingly, even in a democracy, or at least in the best “de-
liberative” conception of one (p. 1), such public sensibilities are 
entitled to no respect: “Democratic governments should respond to 
people’s values, not to their blunders” (p. 126). Sunstein advocates 
expert cost-benefit analysis as the principal device for making the 
law responsive to the former (as reflected primarily in market and 
other forms of private behavior) and not the latter. 
The cultural evaluator model suggests that this strategy bor-
ders on incoherence. In the public consciousness, there is no genu-
ine distinction between the “costs” and “benefits” of putatively 
dangerous activities. Adopting the stance that best expresses their 
cultural values, citizens invariably conclude that activities that af-
firm their preferred way of life are both beneficial and safe, and 
those that denigrate their preferred way of life are both worthless 
and dangerous.115 Moreover, unlike attitudes that reflect overgen-
                                                 
 115 See supra text at notes 54; see also Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations 
of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1740–41 (2003) (noting difficulty posed 
to risk utility analysis by inverse relationship between costs and benefits in public 
risk perceptions). Although we focus here on the challenge cultural cognition 
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eralization, disregard for small probabilities, inattention to base 
rates, and similar manifestations of bounded rationality,116 risk per-
ceptions originating in cultural evaluation are not ones individuals 
are likely to disown once their errors are revealed to them. Even if 
individuals could be made to see that their cultural commitments 
had induced them to attend in a biased fashion to factual informa-
tion about the dangers of, say, nuclear power, guns, or abortion, 
they would likely view those same commitments as justifying their 
policy preferences regardless of the facts.117 
As a result, the idea that expert cost-benefit analysis respects 
citizens’ “values” but not their “blunders” is fundamentally mislead-
ing. When expert regulators reject as irrational public assessments 
of the risks associated with putatively dangerous activities — 
whether nuclear power or handguns, drug use or toxic waste dump-
ing — they are in fact overriding public values. For just as citizens’ 
perceptions of the benefits of these activities express their world-
views, so do their perceptions of the risks they pose. 
As Douglas and Wildavsky argue, public risk disputes, how-
ever much they are dominated by technical analyses of empirical 
data, are in essence “the product of an ongoing political debate 
about the ideal society.”118 Experts might have a more accurate 
sense of the magnitude of various risks (although their conclusions, 
too, are hardly immune from cultural partisanship),119 but they 
have no special competence to identify what vision of society — 
                                                                                                             
presents to cost-benefit analysis, we note that others have suggested additional 
telling criticisms. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On 
Knowing the Cost of Everything and the Value of Nothing (2004); Thomas 
O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 Geo. L.J. 2341 (2002). 
 116 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 21–22, 35–39. 
 117 This is certainly true for firearms. See What Matters More? Conse-
quences or Meanings, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=vie
w&id=104. 
 118 Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 33, at 36. 
 119 See supra text at notes 68–69. 
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hierarchist or egalitarian, individualist or solidarist — the law 
should endorse. That should be a matter of public deliberation. 
Or at least that is the conclusion likely to be reached by any-
one who genuinely favors democratic deliberation. Sunstein 
doesn’t. His is not a program for those who want to reconcile de-
mocracy with a rational response to public fears; it is a program for 
those who fear democracy and seek to exclude the regulation of risk 
from its ambit. 
IV. Culture, Fear, and Liberalism 
But the hard question for anyone who accepts the cultural 
evaluator model as a descriptive matter is whether Sunstein’s fear 
of democracy might indeed be warranted. The cultural evaluator 
model, precisely because it exposes the clash of cultural visions that 
inevitably animates public risk dispute, reveals the potentially deep 
tension between democratically responsive risk regulation and lib-
eralism. 
The rational-weigher and irrational-weigher models disagree 
about the competence of lay persons to assess the costs and benefits 
of various risks. But both accept that the optimal balance is one 
that maximizes satisfaction of individual preferences — or at least 
(in the case of the irrational-weigher model) the preferences indi-
viduals would have were they accurately to perceive the costs and 
benefits of putatively dangerous activities. This position flows natu-
rally from the assumption that the purpose of risk regulation is to 
induce an efficient level of safety. It also, conveniently, implements 
a form of liberal neutrality by treating all persons’ valuation of 
safety relative to other goals as entitled to equal weight. 
But once the connection between risk perception and cultural 
worldviews is exposed, the justification for this ecumenical stance 
becomes less obvious. In selecting some risks for attention and dis-
missing others as unimportant, individuals are, effectively, advanc-
ing their culturally partisan visions of the ideal society. At least for 
anyone who accepts the liberal injunction that the law steer clear 
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of endorsing a moral or cultural orthodoxy,120 it is questionable 
whether risk regulation policy should be responsive to such de-
mands. 
As a practical example, consider whether hospitals should 
have an obligation under the “informed consent” doctrine to in-
form patients of the HIV-positive status of medical personnel. The 
answer might be “of course” if we understand “informed consent” 
doctrine as enabling individual patients to secure treatment consis-
tent with their own medical welfare preferences.121 But the cultural 
evaluator model suggests that the demand for such information 
probably is not linked to “medical welfare” preferences in any 
straightforward sense. Our own study suggests that hierarchists, but 
not egalitarians, individualists, or solidarists, rate the risk of infec-
tion from an HIV-positive surgeon as a serious one.122 If what 
makes hierarchists attend to this risk — while shrugging off many 
more serious ones — is their preference to see the law reflect their 
contested worldview, why should the law credit that preference at 
the expense of those who hold competing worldviews that would be 
denigrated by such a position, not to mention medical personnel 
and other patients who would be adversely affected by it? 
But risk regulation sensibilities animated by the hierarchical 
worldview are hardly the only ones susceptible to these sorts of 
concerns. For example, one might oppose the demand for stricter 
forms of gun control on the ground that it derives not from an ac-
                                                 
 120 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion . . . .). See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice 
in the Liberal State 8 – 12 (1980) (arguing against invocation of partisan view 
of the good to justify policy); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 212 (1993) 
(same). 
 121 See Phillip L. McIntosh, When the Surgeon Has HIV: What to Tell Pa-
tients About the Risk of Transmission, 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 315 (1996). 
 122 See The Cultural Cognition Project, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/102/100/ (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2005). 
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ceptable desire for personal safety,123 but from an illiberal desire to 
erect an egalitarian or solidarist orthodoxy in law. At the same time 
that it extinguishes one ground for interfering with market and po-
litical evaluations of risk — that lay sensibilities are irrational — 
the cultural evaluator model arguably creates another: that those 
sensibilities sometimes reflect an unjust desire to use the expressive 
capital of the law to advance culturally imperialist ends. 
Ironically, if one were convinced that illiberal cultural conflicts 
of this sort were intractable, one solution might be Sunstein’s ver-
sion of the irrational-weigher theory of risk perception. Normative 
legal theories do more than justify particular doctrines and institu-
tional arrangements. They also furnish vocabularies that determine 
how citizens and legal decisionmakers talk to each other about 
what the law should be; those vocabularies, by accentuating or ob-
fuscating conflicts of value, can themselves influence how likely 
such actors are to reach agreement, and how easily they’ll be able 
to get along with each other if they don’t.124 In this respect, the 
irrational-weigher theory’s analytical deficiencies can be seen as 
conflict-abating, discourse virtues: precisely because the theory ig-
nores the decisive role that cultural values play in shaping compet-
ing perceptions of risk, that theory mutes the function that risk 
regulation plays in adjudicating between competing worldviews. So 
defended, the irrational-weigher theory can be seen as implement-
ing in the risk regulation field Sunstein’s preference for “incom-
pletely theorized agreements,” his distinctive strategy for conform-
ing the law to the liberal injunction to avoid endorsement of parti-
san visions of the good.125 
                                                 
 123 Most citizens who support gun control, it turns out, say they would 
favor it even if private possession of handguns reduced crime. See What Matters 
More? Consequences or Meanings, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=vie
w&id=104. 
 124 See Dan M. Kahan, supra note 81, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 419 
(1999). 
 125 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 35 – 
61 (1996). 
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Still, this is a defense of Sunstein’s program that demurs to, 
rather than acquits it of, the charge that it is fundamentally anti-
democratic. A genuinely democratic response to the liberal di-
lemma implicit in risk regulation might be possible too. Delibera-
tion with a form of expressively pluralistic politics might make it 
possible for citizens of diverse worldviews to agree on risk without 
having to assent to law that denigrates anyone’s cultural iden-
tity.126 
The prospects for such a program, particularly carried out in 
the formation of national policymaking, are admittedly uncertain. 
But we are certain that if there is a democratic solution to the lib-
eral dilemma inherent in risk regulation, it can be formulated only 
on the basis of the knowledge that the cultural evaluator model of 
risk furnishes. 
V. Conclusion 
Laws of Fear is a masterful work. No book so comprehensively 
and imaginatively synthesizes and extends existing empirical works 
on risk perception. None more systematically develops these in-
sights into a program for guiding risk regulation. 
At the same time, Laws of Fear’s inattention to the impact of 
cultural worldviews constrains both the descriptive and normative 
power of Sunstein’s irrational-weigher model of risk perception. A 
growing body of research demonstrates that conflicts in perceptions 
of risk, not only between lay persons and experts but also among 
the members of both groups, reflect individuals’ adherence to com-
peting visions of how society should be organized. The cultural-
evaluator model account supported by this work furnishes a much 
more complete account of why risk regulation is a matter of such 
deep and intense conflict. It also undermines both the defense Sun-
stein offers for delegating significant risk-regulatory responsibilities 
                                                 
 126 See Braman & Kahan, supra note 94, at 33–41 (defending an expres-
sively pluralistic approach to resolving the American gun debate); see also supra 
text at notes 94–113 (describing the use of deliberation to generate consensus in 
favor of sound empirical information on risk). 
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to politically insulated experts, and his claim that such a regime is 
“deliberatively democratic.” 
Ironically, though, the inattention of Sunstein’s account to 
culture might itself be viewed by some as a strength. The cultural 
evaluator model of risk perception ruthlessly exposes the inescap-
able role that risk regulation plays in adjudicating disputes between 
competing cultural groups over whose worldview the law will pro-
claim orthodox. Sunstein’s irrational-weigher account strategically 
obscures this function and thus offers one possible technique for 
countering the inherently illiberal tendency of regulatory law. 
The challenge that risk regulation poses to democracy is more 
profound than it appears not only upon first inspection but upon 
second inspection as well. The material well-being of a democratic 
society depends on its ability to rationally manage a near limitless 
variety of often competing risks. The integrity of such a society’s 
commitment to self-governance depends on its ability to fashion 
procedures that are genuinely deliberative, open, and democratic. 
And its obligation to reconcile popular rule with respect for indi-
vidual dignity and freedom requires it to find a mode of regulation 
(and a strategy of regulatory discourse) that deflects the ambitions 
of competing cultural groups to claim the law as theirs and theirs 
alone. 
No account that unqualifiedly celebrates the culturally expres-
sive nature of risk perceptions and risk regulation can hope to 
achieve all of these critical ends. But none that ignores the impact 
of culture on risk perception can hope to achieve them either. 
